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Abstract
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense
theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and
Shapley [GS62]. In this paper, we provide a new upper bound on f(n), the maximum number of
stable matchings that a stable matching instance with n men and n women can have. It has been
a long-standing open problem to understand the asymptotic behavior of f(n) as n → ∞, first
posed by Donald Knuth in the 1970s [Knu76]. Until now the best lower bound was approximately
2.28n, and the best upper bound was 2n logn−O(n). In this paper, we show that for all n,
f(n) ≤ cn for some universal constant c. This matches the lower bound up to the base of the
exponent. Our proof is based on a reduction to counting the number of downsets of a family of
posets that we call “mixing”. The latter might be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical
and empirical study since its introduction in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley in 1962 [GS62].
Variants of the algorithm introduced in [GS62] are widely used in practice, e.g. to match medical res-
idents to hospitals. Stable matching is even the focus of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics [Ram12].
A stable matching instance with n men and n women is defined by a set of preference lists, one
per person. Person i’s preference list gives a ranking over members of the opposite sex. The Stable
Matching Problem is to find a matching (i.e., a bijection) between the men and the women that is
stable, that is, has no blocking pairs. A man m and a woman w form a blocking pair in a matching if
they are not matched to each other, but both prefer the other to their partner in the matching. Gale
and Shapley [GS62] showed that a stable matching always exists and gave an efficient algorithm to
find one.1 Since at least one stable matching always exists, a natural question is to determine the
maximum number of stable matchings an instance of a given size can have. This problem was posed
in the 1970s in a monograph by Knuth [Knu76], and was the first of Gusfield and Irving’s twelve
open problems in their 1989 textbook [GI89]. We denote the maximum number of stable matchings
an instance with n men and n women can have by f(n).
Progress on determining the asymptotics of f(n) has been somewhat slow. The best lower
bound is approximately 2.28n, and the best upper bound prior to this paper was 2n logn−O(n). See
the related work section for a detailed history.
In this paper, we present an improved upper bound.
Theorem 1.1. There is a universal constant c such that f(n), the number of stable matchings in
an instance with n men and n women, is at most cn.
To prove this theorem, we use a result due to Irving and Leather [IL86] that shows that there is a
bijection between the stable matchings of an instance I and the downsets2 of a particular partially-
ordered set (poset) associated with I known as the rotation poset. We show that the rotation poset
associated with a stable matching instance has a particular property that we call n-mixing, and that
any poset with this property has at most cn downsets. All the steps in our proof are elementary.
The bound extends trivially to stable roommates instances. In the stable roommates problem,
a set of n agents rank the other n − 1 agents in the set. The agents are paired off into roommate
pairs, which are stable if no two agents would like to leave their partners and be matched to each
other. A construction of Dean and Munshi [DM10], demonstrates that a stable roommates instance
with n agents can be converted into a stable matching instance with n men and n women, such
that the stable roommate assignments correspond to a subset of the stable matchings in the new
instance. Using this construction, we can apply our upper bound to Stable Roommates.
Theorem 1.2. There is a universal constant c, such that the number of stable assignments in a
stable roommate instance with n agents is at most cn.
1.1 Related Work
Lower bounds: It is trivial to provide instances with 2n/2 stable matchings by combining disjoint
instances of size 2. Irving and Leather constructed a family of instances [IL86] which has since been
1Stable matching algorithms were actually developed and used as early as 1951 to match interns to hospitals [Sta53].
2See section 2 for definitions of all the relevant terminology.
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shown by Knuth3 to contain at least Ω(2.28n) matchings. Irving and Leather’s family only has
instances for n which is a power of 2. Benjamin, Converse, and Krieger also provided a lower bound
on f(n) by creating a family of instances with Ω(2n
√
n) matchings [BCK95]. While this is fewer
matchings than the instances in [IL86], Benjamin et al.’s family has instances for every even n, not
just powers of 2. In 2002, Thurber extended Irving and Leather’s lower bound to all values of n.
For n powers of 2, Thurber’s construction exactly coincides with Irving and Leather’s. For all other
n, the construction produces a lower bound of 2.28n/clogn for some constant c [Thu02]. To date,
this lower bound of Ω(2.28n) is the best known. We refer the reader to Manlove’s textbook for a
more thorough description of the history of these lower bounds [Man13].
Upper bounds: Trivially, there are at most n! stable matchings (as there are at most n! bijections
between the men and women). The first progress on upper bounds that we are aware of was made
by Stathoupolos in his 2011 Master’s thesis [Sta11], where he proves that the number of stable
matchings is at most O(n!/cn) for some constant c. A more recent paper of Drgas-Burchardt and
Świtalski shows a weaker upper bound of approximately 34n! [DBŚ13]. All previous upper bounds
have the form 2n logn−O(n).
Restricted preferences: The number of possible stable matchings has also been studied under
various models restricting or randomizing the allowable preference lists. If all preference lists are
equally likely and selected independently for each agent, Pittel shows that the expected number
of stable matchings is O(n log n) [Pit89]. Applying Markov’s Inequality shows that the number of
stable matchings is polynomial in n with probability 1− o(1). Therefore, the lower bound instances
described above are a vanishingly small fraction of all instances. Work of Hoffman, Levy, and
Mossel (described in Levy’s PhD thesis [Lev17]) shows that under a Mallows model [Mal57], where
preference lists are selected with probability proportional to the number of inversions in the list,
the number of stable matchings is Cn with high probability (where the constant C depends on the
exact parameters of the model).
The number of attainable partners4 a person can have has also been the subject of much research.
Knuth, Motwani, and Pittel show that the number of attainable partners is O(log n) with high
probability if the lists are uniformly random [KMP90]. Immorlica and Mahdian show that if agents
on one side of the instance have random preference lists of length k (and consider all other agents
unacceptable) the expected number of agents with more than one attainable partner depends only on
k (and not on n) [IM05]. Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno show that if the number of men and women
is unbalanced, with uniformly random lists, the fraction of agents with more than one attainable
partner is 1− o(1) with high probability [AKL17].
Counting: A natural computational problem is to count the number of stable matchings in a
given instance as efficiently as possible. Irving and Leather show that finding the exact number
of matchings is #P -complete [IL86], so finding an approximate count is a more realistic goal.
Bhatnagar, Greenberg, and Randall consider instances where preference lists come from restricted
models [BGR08]; for example, those in which the preference lists reflect linear combinations of k
“attributes” of the other set, or where every agent appears in a “range” of k consecutive positions in
3Personal communication, as described in [GI89].
4 Woman w is an attainable partner of man m if there is a stable matching in which they are matched to each
other.
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every preference list. In both of these cases, they show that a natural Markov Chain Monte Carlo
approach does not produce a good approximation (as the chain does not mix efficiently). As part of
their proof, they show the number of stable matchings can still be as large as cn for some constant
c < 2.28, even in these restricted cases.
A formal hardness result was later shown by Dyer, Goldberg, Greenhill, and Jerrum [DGGJ04].
They show approximately counting the number of stable matchings is equivalent to approximately
counting for a class of problems, canonically represented by #BIS.5 This hardness result was
strengthened by Chebolu, Goldberg, and Martin [CGM12] to hold even if the instances come from
some of the restricted classes of [BGR08].
The heart of all of these results is the rotation poset (originally developed in [IL86]), which we
use and describe in section 4.
Stable matching in general: See the books by Roth and Sotomayor [RS92], Gusfield and Irv-
ing [GI89], Manlove [Man13], and Knuth [Knu97] for more about the topic of stable matching. For
many examples of stable matching in the real world, see [Rot15].
2 Preliminaries and main technical theorem
In this section, we review standard terminology regarding partially ordered sets, describe the key
property of a poset we will use, and state our main technical theorem (Theorem 2.5).
Definition 2.1 (Poset). A partially ordered set (or poset) (V,≺), is defined by a set V and a binary
relation, ≺, on V satisfying:
• Antisymmetry: For all distinct u, v ∈ V if u ≺ v then v 6≺ u, and
• Transitivity: for all u, v, w ∈ V if u ≺ v and v ≺ w then u ≺ w.
Two elements u, v ∈ V are comparable if u ≺ v or v ≺ u. They are incomparable otherwise.
If u ≺ v, we say u is dominated by v and v dominates u.
Definition 2.2 (Chain). A set S of elements is called a chain if each pair of elements in S is
comparable. In other words, for ` > 0, a chain of length ` is a sequence of elements v1 ≺ v2 ≺ v3 ≺
· · · ≺ v`.
A set of elements is called an antichain if they are pairwise incomparable.
Definition 2.3 (Downset). A downset of a partial order is an antichain and all elements dominated
by some element of that antichain.
Observe that a downset is closed under ≺. That is, for any downset S, if v ∈ S and u ≺ v then
u ∈ S.
The following is the key property of the posets associated with stable matching instances that
we will use in the proof.
5More specifically, they show an FPRAS for the number of stable matchings exists if and only if one exists for
#BIS, approximately counting the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph. Goldberg and Jerrum conjecture
that no such FPRAS exists [GJ12]. See [CGM12] for formal definitions.
4
nn
Figure 1: A 2n-mixing poset with respect to chains defined by the red and blue paths. A path
in the graph from v to u indicates that u ≺ v. That is, the poset is the transitive closure of the
arrows shown. For any set U of k elements, there are at least 2
√
k chains that contain one of these
elements.
Definition 2.4 (n-mixing). A poset (V,≺) is n-mixing if there exist n chains C1, . . . , Cn (not
necessarily disjoint) such that
i) Every element of V belongs to at least one chain, i.e., ∪ni=1Ci = V ,
ii) For any U ⊆ V , there are at least 2√|U | chains each containing an element of U .
Observe that if a poset is formed by n disjoint chains, each of length `, it has about `n downsets,
and ` could be arbitrarily bigger than n. But such a poset is not mixing, since taking U to be the
set of elements on one of the chains violates property ii) of mixing. For an example of a mixing
poset, see Figure 1. We can now state our main technical theorem.
Theorem 2.5. There is a universal constant c, such that if a poset is n-mixing, then it has at most
cn downsets.
Note that the n-mixing property immediately implies that the poset has at most n2 elements;
just let U = V in the above definition. A poset with n2 elements covered by n chains can have at
most (n + 1)n downsets (this is achieved for n equal length chains). So, the main contribution of
the above theorem is to improve this trivial upper bound to cn for some constant c.
Theorem 2.5 is the main technical contribution of this work. The proof is contained in section 3.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1.1 we use the following theorem relating mixing posets to stable
matchings.
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Theorem 2.6. For every stable matching instance I with a total of n men and women, there exists
an n-mixing poset (R,≺), called the rotation poset, such that the number of downsets of the poset
is equal to the number of stable matchings of I.
Note that Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.6 immediately imply Theorem 1.1. We prove Theorem 2.6
in section 4, by combining existing observations about the rotation poset.
3 Proof of main technical theorem
In this section we prove Theorem 2.5. The proof proceeds by finding an element v of the poset
which dominates and is dominated by many elements. We then count downsets by considering
those downsets that contain v and those that do not. Since v dominates and is dominated by many
elements, the size of each remaining instance is significantly smaller, yielding the bound.
Formally, we say an element is α-critical if it dominates α elements and is dominated by α
elements. The key lemma is that there is always an Ω((|V |/n)3/2)-critical element.
Lemma 3.1. Let (V,≺) be an n-mixing poset with respect to chains C1, . . . , Cn, and define d = |V |n .
For some universal constants d0 > 1 and c0 > 0, there is an element v ∈ V such that v is (c0d3/2)-
critical as long as d ≥ d0.
We prove Lemma 3.1 in subsection 3.1 via a counting argument.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 2.5 using Lemma 3.1. We bound the number of
downsets by induction on d.
Our base case is when d = d0. In this case, the number of downsets is maximized when the
chains are all the same length, so we have an upper bound of (d0 + 1)n.
For larger d, first we identify a
(
c0d
3/2
)
-critical element v. The number of downsets containing
v is the number of downsets in the poset remaining after we delete v and everything it dominates.
Similarly, the number of downsets not containing v is the number of downsets in the poset remaining
after we delete v and everything dominating v. In both cases, the resulting poset is still n-mixing,
so we can induct. We call such a step (choosing a critical element) an iteration.
It remains to bound the number of downsets that this process enumerates. By the n-mixing
property, there are at most n2 elements in the initial poset. We partition the iterations into phases,
where in phase i we reduce the size of the poset from n
2
2i
elements to n
2
2i+1
elements. By definition,
in phase i, d ≥ n
2i+1
. So, we can bound the number of iterations required in phase i (call it ki) by:
c0
( n
2i+1
)3/2
ki >
n2
2i+1
.
Rearranging, we see that it suffices to choose ki = 2(i+1)/2
√
n/c0. We continue until d = d0.
Summing across all phases, the number of choices to make is at most
√
n
c0
logn∑
i=0
2(i+1)/2 < 5
n
c0
.
So, the algorithm enumerates at most (d0+1)n downsets in the base case and it makes at most 5n/c0
choices during the inductive process. Thus, the number of downsets is at most (d0 + 1)n25n/c0 = cn
as required.
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3.1 Proof of main technical lemma
Finally, we prove Lemma 3.1, i.e. we show that any n-mixing poset (V,≺) contains a c0d3/2-critical
element as long as d ≥ d0. (Recall that d = |V |/n.)
We make use of the standard graph representation of the partial order: In this graph there is
a node for each element of the partial order, and a directed edge from v to u if u ≺ v. Of course,
this directed graph is acyclic. Henceforth, we refer only to this DAG rather than to the poset and
partition the nodes of the DAG into levels as follows: Level 1 nodes are those with no outgoing
edges, i.e., sinks of the DAG, and level i nodes are those whose longest path to a sink (i.e., a level
1 node) has exactly i nodes. Note that each level is an antichain.
Next, we create n disjoint subchains S1, . . . , Sn. The subchain Si will be a subset of the nodes
in Ci. We perform the assignment of nodes to subchains by processing up the DAG level by level.
Initialize every subchain Si to be empty. For each node u, consider the set of indices I(u) = {j :
u ∈ Cj}. Assign u to the subchain for an index in I(u) which currently has the fewest nodes among
those chains, i.e. arg minj∈I(u) |Sj |, breaking ties arbitrarily. If u is the kth node assigned to a
subchain Si, then we say the height of u is k. By construction, the following properties hold:
(a) The Si’s are chains, since Si ⊆ Ci.
(b) The Si’s are disjoint.
(c) If u has height h, then u dominates at least h − 1 nodes in each of the subchains Sj such
that j ∈ I(u) (i.e., {j : u ∈ Cj}).
Claim 3.2. Let D be the set of nodes of height at least bd/2c. Each node u ∈ D dominates at least
c0 · d3/2 nodes, for d ≥ d0, where c0 and d0 are universal constants.
Proof. Suppose that u ∈ Si ∩ D is at height ` ≥ bd/2c and let D(u) be the nodes in Si of height
d`/2e through `. By the mixing property, these nodes lie on at least 2√b`/2c chains C. Moreover, by
construction, on each subchain Sj ∈ C, at least b`/2c−1 nodes are dominated by some node in D(u)
and hence are dominated by u. Therefore, u dominates at least (b`/2c−1) ·2√b`/2c+(b`/2c−1) =
Ω(d3/2) nodes.
Since the number of nodes in the DAG is dn, we conclude:
Corollary 3.3. There is a set D of strictly more than |V |/2 nodes, that each dominate Ω(d3/2)
nodes.
A symmetric argument in which subchains are built starting from the sources of the DAG shows
that there is a set D of strictly more than |V |/2 nodes that are dominated by Ω(d3/2) nodes.
Therefore, there is some node v in the intersection of D and D. This is the c0d3/2-critical node we
seek.
Remark 3.4. A crude analysis shows that c0 ≥ 1/8 when d0 > 25.
4 Rotations and the rotation poset
In this section we present a key theorem of Irving and Leather [IL86] and show how it can be used
to prove Theorem 2.6.
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Theorem 2.6. For every stable matching instance I with a total of n men and women, there exists
an n-mixing poset (R,≺), called the rotation poset, such that the number of downsets of the poset
is equal to the number of stable matchings of I.
We begin with the definitions needed to prove Theorem 2.6.
Definition 4.1 (Rotation). Let k ≥ 2. A rotation ρ is an ordered list of pairs
ρ = ((m0, w0), (m1, w1), . . . , (mk−1, wk−1))
that are matched in some stable matchingM with the property that for every i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k−1,
woman wi+1 (where the subscript is taken mod k) is the highest ranked woman on mi’s preference
list satisfying:
i) man mi prefers wi to wi+1, and
ii) woman wi+1 prefers mi to mi+1.
In this case, we say ρ is exposed in M .
We will sometimes abuse notation and think of a rotation as the set containing those pairs. Also,
we will need the following facts about rotations later.
Lemma 4.2 ([IL86, Lemma 4.7]). A pair (m,w) can appear in at most one rotation.
Lemma 4.3 ([GI89, Lemma 2.5.1]). If ρ is a rotation with consecutive pairs (mi, wi), and (mi+1, wi+1),
and w is a woman between wi and wi+1 in mi’s preference list, then there is no stable matching
containing the pair (mi, w).
Definition 4.4 (Elimination of a Rotation). Let ρ = ((m0, w0), . . . , (mk−1, wk−1)) be a rotation
exposed in stable matching M . The rotation ρ is eliminated from M by matching mi to w(i+1) mod k,
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, leaving all other pairs in M unchanged, i.e., matching M is replaced with
matching M ′, where
M ′ := M\ρ ∪ {(m0, w1), (m1, w2), . . . , (mk−1, w0)}.
Note that when we eliminate a rotation from M , the resulting matching M ′ is stable.6
Irving and Leather studied the following process: Fix a stable matching instance I. Starting
at the man-optimal matching7, choose a rotation in the current matching, and eliminate it. They
show that for any stable matching M , there is a set of rotations, R(M), one can eliminate (starting
from the man-optimal matching) that will yield M .
6Switching from M to M ′ makes all the women in ρ happier and all the men in ρ less happy. It is easy to check
that this switch cannot create a blocking pair inside the set ρ. The only other possibility for a blocking pair is a man
in ρ with a woman outside ρ. For (mi ∈ ρ,w 6∈ ρ) to become a blocking pair, mi would have to prefer w to wi+1,
but by the definition of rotation, wi+1 was the first woman on m’s list who would prefer to be matched to him, so he
cannot prefer w to wi+1. See also [GI89, Lemma 2.5.2].
7 A fascinating fact about stable matching is that there is a matching, known as the man-optimal matching, in
which each man is matched with his favorite attainable partner. Recall that woman w is attainable for man m if
there is some stable matching in which they are matched.
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However, there is a partial order on the set of rotations – some must be eliminated before
others.8 If ρ must be eliminated before ρ′, we write ρ ≺ ρ′. Let R be the set of rotations for a stable
matching instance, and let ≺ be that partial order on the rotations defined by elimination order.
We call this poset the rotation poset. See Figure 2 for an example of a stable matching instance
and the corresponding rotation poset.
For our purposes, the important result relating the rotation poset to stable matchings is the
following.
Theorem 4.5 ([IL86, Theorem 4.1]). For any stable matching instance, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between downsets of the rotation poset and the set of stable matchings. In other
words, the number of stable matchings is exactly equal to the number of downsets of (R,≺).
Indeed, the downset corresponding to M is exactly the set R(M) discussed above.
Thus, to prove Theorem 2.6, it remains to show that the rotation poset associated to any
stable matching instance with a total of n men and women is n-mixing. First we construct the
chains C1, . . . , Cn. We are going to have one chain for each agent (man or woman), where the
corresponding chain contains all the rotations that include that agent. Call these sets C1, . . . , Cn.
To prove that C1, . . . , Cn is n-mixing, we first need to show that each Ci is indeed a chain, i.e.,
every pair of rotations where a specific agent appears are comparable and second we need to show
that C1, . . . , Cn satisfy property (ii) of Definition 2.4.
Claim 4.6. If two rotations share an agent, then they are comparable.9
Proof. First, suppose that the shared agent is a man. If it is a woman, we can just switch the
designations of “men” and “women” and use the same proof on the “reversed” version of the rotation
graph. Let ρ1, ρ2 be rotations sharing an agent m, and let m be matched to w1 in ρ1 and w2 in ρ2,
where m prefers w1 to w2.
For the sake of contradiction assume that ρ1 and ρ2 are incomparable. We show that there
exists a rotation ρ which causes m to skip over w1. This would contradict Lemma 4.3 as it implies
that (m,w1) belongs to no stable matching.
Suppose we start from the man optimal stable matching and eliminate all rotations dominated by
ρ2 and letM be the resulting stable matching. By the correspondence in Theorem 4.5, (m,w2) ∈M .
Since m prefers w1 to w2, there must be a rotation ρ that we eliminated which caused m to be
matched to someone worse than w1 for the first time. Since ρ2 and ρ1 are incomparable, ρ1 6= ρ.
Therefore, by Lemma 4.2 (m,w1) /∈ ρ; so, ρ caused m to skip over w1. This is a contradiction.
Claim 4.7. Every set of k rotations contains at least 2
√
k agents.
Proof. We argue by contrapositive. Suppose we have a set of rotations involving fewer than 2
√
k
agents. Every rotation contains a (man, woman) pair, who (by Lemma 4.2) have not appeared
together before. With fewer than 2
√
k agents, there are strictly less than k (man, woman) pairs
which can appear, and thus fewer than k rotations in the set.
8For example, a rotation containing a pair (m,w) is not exposed (and thus cannot be eliminated) until that pair
is matched, so a rotation with consecutive pairs (m,w′), (m′, w) must be eliminated first. The details of exactly
when one rotation must be eliminated before another are not of direct use to us (we only require the rather coarse
description in Claim 4.6), so we do not describe them here. See [IL86] or [GI89] for a full description of the poset.
9This observation is not novel; for example, it is implicit in the discussion of [GI89], but we have not seen the
statement explicitly written down, so we prove it here.
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5 Conclusion
We have shown there is some constant c such that f(n) ≤ cn. We have not made a significant effort
to optimize the constants in our argument, favoring ease of exposition over the exact result. By
making a few minor changes to the argument, we obtain f(n) ≤ 217n for sufficiently large n. A
more careful argument could probably improve this constant somewhat, but this approach will not
get a constant c close to the (approximately) 2.28 we would need to match the best known lower
bound. Determining the precise asymptotic behavior of f(n) remains an interesting open problem.
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